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Abstract
It is claimed in Phys. Lett. A by T. Nishioka et al. [327 (2004) 28–32] that the
security of Y-00 is equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher. In this paper it is
shown that the claim is false in either the use of Y-00 for direct encryption or key
generation, in all the parameter ranges it is supposed to operate including those of
the experiments reported thus far. The security of Y-00 type protocols is clarified.
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Anew approach to quantum cryptog-
raphy called KCQ, (keyed communi-
cation in quantum noise), has been
developed [1] on the basis of a differ-
ent advantage creation principle from
that in either uncorrelated-classical-
noise key generation [2] or the well
known BB84 quantum protocol [3].
A special case called αη (or Y-00 in
Japan) has been experimentally in-
vestigated and developed to a consid-
erable extent [4,5,6,7,8] for direct en-
cryption. In Ref.[9], the claim is made
that Y-00 is equivalent to a classi-
cal stream cipher, in particular that
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the quantum noise is negligible, and
thus also cannot be used for key gen-
eration. This claim is justified by an
”attack” that reduces the security of
Y-00 to that of a standard stream ci-
pher for the purpose of obtaining the
data bits from observing the output
of Y-00. In this paper, we will show
that this claim is patently false.
The main explicit claim in [9] is that
their classical stream cipher, “Case
2”, has the same security as Y-00, and
so can be employed instead. We will
refute this claim in connection with
both data and key security (the latter
is not even considered in [9]) , in di-
rect encryption as well as in key gen-
eration, and also show that their “at-
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tack” is an ineffective one on Y-00.
One basic error in [9] is the assump-
tion that Y-00 with the parameters
reported in [4,5,6,7,8] is reducible
to their “Case 1” cipher for which
Eq. (10) of [9] is valid without er-
ror. Such error of course decreases
with increasing coherent-state en-
ergy, but it is trivial to claim that
a coherent-state system is classical
when the energy in the system is
large enough as compared to all the
parameters of the operating scheme.
We have always qualified our own
claim by saying that the coherent-
state energy is“mesoscopic”. In the
case of direct encryption parameters
reported experimentally [4,5,6,7,8],
the reduction of Ref. [9] results in a
classical stream cipher in quantum
noise with an error rate of∼1% , and
has already been analyzed in detail
by the Hirota group [10]. Further-
more, even when the coherent-state
quantum noise of Y-00 can in princi-
ple be replaced by classical random-
ization, such randomization makes
Y-00 a random cipher. It is known
that a random cipher may have bet-
ter secret-key security compared to
a classical stream cipher, such as
“Case 2” of [9], which is nonrandom.
Another error made in [9] may arise
from the incorrect claimmade in [12].
This involves Fig. 4 of [9] and the dis-
cussion around it pertaining to the
use of Y-00 for key generation, with
the key being used subsequently in a
classical cipher. The protocol of Fig.
4 is seriously incomplete for key gen-
eration and is not one we intended or
claimed to use. Before further elabo-
ration on these errors in [9], we first
briefly review the Y-00 scheme and
remove a very common misconcep-
tion about direct encryption versus
key generation.
Consider the original experimental
scheme Y-00 as described in Ref. [4]
and depicted in Fig. 1. Alice encodes
each data bit into a coherent state
in a qumode, an infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space, of the form [11]
|αℓ〉 = |α0(cos θℓ + i sin θℓ)〉 (1)
where α0 is real, θℓ = 2πℓ/M , and
ℓ ∈ {0, ..., m − 1}. The M states
are divided into M/2 basis pairs
of antipodal signals {| ± αℓ〉} with
−αℓ = αℓ+M/2. A seed key K of bit
length |K| is used to drive a conven-
tional encryption mechanism whose
output is a much longer running
key K ′ that is used to determine,
for each qumode carrying the bit
b{= 0, 1}, which pair {| ± αℓ〉} is to
be used. Bob utilizes a quantum re-
ceiver to decide on b knowing which
particular pair {| ± αℓ〉} is to be dis-
criminated. On the other hand, Eve
needs to pick a quantum measure-
ment for her attack in the absence
of the basis knowledge provided by
the seed or running key. The differ-
ence in the resulting receiver perfor-
mance is a quantum effect with no
classical analog, and constitutes the
ground for possible advantage cre-
ation in the scheme. Note that since
the quantum-measurement noise is
irreducible, such advantage creation
can result in an unconditionally se-
cure key generation protocol. In con-
trast, in a classical situation includ-
ing noise, the simultaneous measure-
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Fig. 1. Left: Overall schematic of the Y-00 scheme. Right: Depiction of M/2 bases
with interleaved logical state mappings.
ment of the amplitude and phase of
the signal, as realized optically by
heterodyning, provides the general
optimal measurement for both Bob
and Eve; thus preventing any ad-
vantage creation under our approach
that grants Eve a copy of the state
for the purpose of bounding her in-
formation.
One needs to first distinguish the use
of such a scheme for key generation
versus data encryption. It may first
appear that if the system is secure
for data encryption, it would also be
secure for key generation if the data
are subsequently used as keys. This
is indeed the view taken in Ref. [9]
and Ref. [12]. It is unfortunate that
the author of Ref. [12], a co-author of
Refs. [4,5], made this conclusion that
the direct encryption experiments in
[4,5] would already allow key genera-
tion inspite of our objections. In fact,
for the direct encryption experiments
in Refs. [4,5,6,7,8], we have only
claimed complexity-based security
against general attacks, with “un-
conditional security” only against a
very limited class of “individual at-
tacks.” The situation may be delin-
eated as follows. Let Xn, Y
E
n , Y
B
n be
the classical random vectors describ-
ing the bit data of length n, Eve’s
observation, and Bob’s observation.
Eve may make any quantum mea-
surement on her copy of the quantum
signal to obtain Y En in her attack. In
the case of a standard classical ci-
pher, Y En = Y
B
n = Yn, the following
Shannon limit [13] applies
H(Xn|Yn) ≤ H(K) (2)
and so there can be no fresh key
generation. This is because all the
uncertainty in Xn is derived from K,
however long n is. While H(Xn|Y En )
describes the level of information-
theoretic security of the data Xn
against ciphertext-only attacks,
H(K|Y En ) describes the information-
theoretic security of the key against
ciphertext-only attacks with known
a priori probability p(Xn), thus in-
cluding known and chosen plaintext
attacks in the case of degenerate
p(Xn). See Ref. [14] and [1] for fur-
ther discussion. In standard cryptog-
raphy, one typically does not worry
about ciphertext-only attack on com-
3
pletely random data, where Eq. (2)
is usually satisfied with equality for
large n for the designed key length
|K| = H(K). Rather, it is attacks
on the key with known nonuniform
p(Xn), using information on K so
obtained on future data, that is the
focus of concern, as in the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES).
The reduction of Y-00 to the classi-
cal stream cipher of ref [9] consists in
collapsing any observation to a sin-
gle bit li, with the claim that, as de-
scribed in Eq. (9)-(11) of [9],
li = xi ⊕ k˜i (3)
where xi is the data bit [15] at the
ith position of the data sequence,
and k˜i is a fixed function of the run-
ning key that determines the basis
used for that position. Each li is 0 or
1 according to whether Eve’s obser-
vation on the ith qumode lies on the
upper or lower half-circle with re-
spect to the “horizontal” basis given
by the all zero running key. However,
Eq. (3) is not always true due to the
quantum noise in Eve’s measurement
which sometimes pushes the mea-
sured result to the wrong side of the
horizontal line. From the intrinsic
coherent-state angular uncertainty
with a phase standard deviation of
1/α0, an estimate of the bit error rate
PEb ∼ 2/(πα0) (4)
is simply obtained if one assumes
that the measured state is uniformly
distributed within a standard devi-
ation only. In deriving Eq. (4) we
have also used the fact that the
(M/2) bases are selected with uni-
form marginal probability for each
qumode, which is a consequence of
using, e.g., a LFSR for the ENC
box of Fig. 1 with seed key length
|K| ≥ log2(M/2). This PEb is in
rough agreement with the numer-
ical calculations of ref [10], which
includes the optimal quantum re-
ceiver performance result for this
“attack” via the optimal binary de-
cision measurement. The resulting
1% error means that for the pur-
pose of attacking the data Xn, the
reduction is equivalent to a classical
stream cipher with unknown K re-
ceived in noise that causes 1% error
in the output ciphertext. Thus, Y-00
is not equivalent to a classical stream
cipher, but rather to one in signifi-
cant noise even in the experimental
regime reported thus far. Indeed, not
only do such errors invalidate the
Shannon limit Eq. (2) for a standard
stream cipher, they also create ad-
vantage for the users and allow key
generation in the usual fashion [2].
To see that the error rate of 1% is
significant, note that it allows a sub-
stantial key generation rate of 10
Mbps for a raw bit rate of 1 Gbps,
using privacy amplification [16]. The
authors of [9] mistakenly omit the
privacy amplification step required
for key generation in their Fig. 4.
On the other hand, a stronger attack
may be launched on Y-00 by mak-
ing a heterodyne measurement which
retains all the log2M bits of output
for each qumode. Under such an at-
tack, the cipher becomes a classical
random cipher in principle, satisfying
Eq. (2) with the experimental param-
eters of [4]. This is because the ex-
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periments on the original Y-00 have
parameters that satisfy
H(Xn|Y En , K) ∼ 0 (5)
when the heterodyne measurement
is made on each qumode by Eve.
Under Eq. (5), Eq. (2) also obtains
and the data security is no better
than |K| as in all standard sym-
metric key ciphers. Furthermore, in
this regime, and under the hetero-
dyne attack which is more powerful
than that of [9], key generation with
information-theoretic security is im-
possible in principle, a point missed
in ref [12] and in all the criticisms
of Y-00 including ref [9] and ref [17],
but was explicitly stated in the first
version of ref [1]. This point is at
least implicit in ref [4] where we said
the experiment has to be modified
for key generation. One simple way
to break the Shannon limit Eq. (2)
while protecting the key at the same
time is to randomize (unkeyed) the
state transmitted to cover the half-
circle defined by the basis chosen by
the running key, which we call DSR
in [1]. Indeed, the resulting noise be-
havior for Eve is similar to the 1%
error neglected in ref [9], and is also
the basis of advantage creation for
key generation. Clearly, there is no
room to go into any detail on such
variations and extensions of Y-00 in
this paper.
Nevertheless, it is important to note
that heterodyning by Eve does not
reduce Y-00 to a classical stream ci-
pher even under Eq. (5). Rather, it
reduces it to a random cipher, i.e.,
a cipher with randomized encryption
[18] so that
H(Yn|Xn, K) 6= 0, (6)
which can be accomplished classi-
cally in principle, but not in current
practice. This is because true ran-
dom numbers can only be generated
physically, not by an algorithm, and
the practical rate for such genera-
tion is five to six orders of magnitude
below the ∼ Gbps rate in our ex-
periments where the coherent-state
quantum noise does the randomiza-
tion automatically. Furthermore, our
physical “analog” scheme does not
sacrifice bandwidth or data rate com-
pared to other known randomization
techniques. There is an unexplored
avenue with respect to a random ci-
pher in that there is no proof that
the key is not information-theoretic
secure, i.e., that K can be pinned
down by a long Yn via the unicity
distance with known p(Xn) as in a
non-randomized cipher [13,18,19],
whether p(Xn) is degenerate or not.
Indeed, it is known [20] that a spe-
cific kind of randomized encryption
can defeat any attack on the key
when the source generates indepen-
dent data bits with p(X = 0) 6= 1/2.
Since the coherent-state quantum
noise makes efficient high-rate ran-
domized encryption possible in prac-
tice in Y-00, it is indeed a quantum
cipher in the important sense that an
essential feature of the cipher arises
from quantum noise.
In this connection, we address the
attacks described by Lo and Ko [17],
which can be launched either when a
long sequence of plaintext is known
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or when the plaintext statistics are
nonuniform. Therefore, they are not
directly applicable to Y-00 used for
key generation. These attacks can
however be launched on a classi-
cal cipher that uses the generated
key, and the authors of [17] give an
argument that reduces such an at-
tack to a similar one directly on the
data sent in the key generation step.
However, this reduction is incorrect
becuase, as in [9], the privacy am-
plification step in the key generation
stage is omitted. Furthermore, their
attacks are impractical in that they
require exponential loss or exponen-
tially long input n−sequences [21]
and exponential search. They also
miss the distinction between ran-
dom and non-random ciphers with
regard to attacks on the key. Also,
the Grover search attack desribed in
[17] is claimed to break Y-00 because
in the asymptotic n → ∞ limit,
the output states corresponding to
different seed key values become or-
thogonal. In addition to the subtle
problem of orthogonality in a non-
separable Hilbert space, it makes
little cryptographic sense, even for a
non-random cipher, to just look at
the asymptotic n→∞ limit. Indeed,
Shannon calls a system that is bro-
ken only at n→∞ “ideal” [13,18].
The claimed “Case 2” non-random-
cipher reduction of Y-00 in [9] has
weaker security against attacks on
the key compared to Y-00 due to the
1% error that exists in the attack of
[9] on Y-00. This error induces ran-
dom errors on the actual bases or
running key estimate, and may allow
some information-theoretic security
on K. Indeed, even under a general
attack, the logical possibility is open
that Y-00 is information-theoretic
secure or at least Shannon “ideal”.
Even if such turns out not to be the
case, the “Case 2” cipher still has less
key security against known-plaintext
attacks than Y-00 for the following
reason. Any given classical nonran-
dom cipher can be used as the ENC
box in Y-00 which then provides an
added layer of protection through
the coherent-state modulation. Even
under the heterodyne attack that
utilizes the full state observation,
one obtains the following brute-force
key-search complexity corresponding
to the number of possible running
key sequences for large n,
C ∼ ( λM√
2πα0
)|K|/ log2(
M
2
) (7)
where λ = 2 for ciphertext-only at-
tack(i.e. random data) and λ = 1 for
known-plaintext attacks. The esti-
mate Eq. (7) is obtained by count-
ing only the possible states within
one standard deviation of the phase,
which is actually an underestimate
for large n. With our experimental
parameters of M ∼ 4 × 103, α0 ∼
2 × 102, |K| ∼ 4.4 × 103 [8], one has
C & 2480 for λ = 1, well beyond
any conceivable classical or quan-
tum search capability. Note that the
Grover’s search described in [17] suf-
fers from a similar exponential lim-
itation. This search is needed to at-
tack the ENC box seed key from its
output, which is absent for a nonran-
dom classical stream cipher where
the ENC output is uniquely specified
in a known-plaintext attack. One
may match the ENC cipher rate to
the data rate in Y-00 by using a to-
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tal of log2
M
2
different deterministic
functions fi to operate on a given
running key segment of log2
M
2
bits
to provide the bases for log2
M
2
data
bits. Although this would lower the
estimate Eq. (7) in general, under
a known-plaintext attack a search
complexity remains for pinning down
the possible outputs of the ENC box
whereas the output of the ENC box
is uniquely specified for the “Case
2” cipher. Note, however, that for
ciphertext-only attacks on K (i.e.
those for which the plaintext is ran-
dom), a classical stream cipher can
provide information-theoretic secu-
rity.
We briefly describe the possibility
of key generation with the origi-
nal Y-00 of Fig.1. The condition
for information-theoretically secure
fresh key generation is, in general
H(Xn|Y En , K) > H(Xn|Y Bn , K). (8)
In Eq. (8), Y En is obtained from a
quantum measurement without the
knowledge of K. It is then used to-
gether with any value of K to esti-
mate the data Xn. This necessary
condition has to be supplemented
with one on the key K security for
defense against adaptive measure-
ments, as discussed in [1], to make it
sufficient also. This would require the
extension of Y-00 in different possi-
ble ways, such as DSR and CPPM
described in [1]. However, against in-
dividual attacks with a fixed qumode
measurement, Eq. (8) is sufficient
and can be readily seen to hold as
follows. With S ≡ |α0|2 being the
average photon number in the states
(1), the bit-error rate for Bob with
the optimum quantum receiver [22] is
Pb =
1
4
e−4S. (9)
The bit-error rate for heterodyning,
considered as a possible attack, is the
well known Gaussian result
P hetb ∼
1
2
e−S, (10)
and that for the optimum-phase mea-
surement tailored to the states in (1)
is
P phb ∼
1
2
e−2S (11)
over a wide range of S. The difference
between Eq. (9) and Eq. (11) allows
key generation at any value of S if n is
long enough. With a mesoscopic sig-
nal level S ∼ 7, one has Pb ∼ 10−12,
P hetb ∼ 10−3, P phb ∼ 10−6. For rea-
sonable n, this contradicts the claim
in [9] that quantum effects are neg-
ligible until S < 1 + 1/
√
2, as fol-
lows. If the data arrives at a rate
of 1 Gbps, Bob is likely to have 109
error-free bits in 1 second, while Eve
would have ∼ 106 or ∼ 103 errors
in her 109 bits with heterodyne or
the optimum-phase measurement
(which has no known experimental
realization). With the usual privacy
amplification, the users can then
generate ∼ 106 or ∼ 103 bits in the 1
second interval by eliminating Eve’s
information. While these parameter
values are not particularly remark-
able and have not been experimen-
tally demonstrated, they compare
favorably with coherent-state BB84
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schemes where S ∼ 0.1 and a seri-
ous beam-splitting attack for 3 dB
loss also obtains that wipes out the
quantum advantage (though not the
post-detection selection advantage)
Bob has even with intrusion-level
detection. More significantly, Y-00
illustrates the new KCQ principle of
quantum key generation introduced
in [1], that creates advantage via the
difference between optimal quantum
receiver performance with versus
without knowledge of a secret key,
which is more powerful than previous
principles that rely on intrusion-level
detection.
In conclusion, the reduction of Y-00
to a classical stream cipher claimed in
[9] is incorrect for data bit encryption
because it still suffers from coherent-
state quantum noise for typical op-
erating parameters. It weakens both
the data and key security, possibly
information-theoretically and cer-
tainly complexity-wise. It is also in-
applicable to fresh key generation
because it does not recognize the
seed key influence on the optimal
quantum receiver performance and
because it ignores privacy amplifica-
tion. The principle underlying Y-00
can be used in conjunction with ad-
ditional techniques to obtain much
more powerful advantage creation
for key generation, as well as near
perfect information-theoretic secu-
rity for the data and the key in direct
encryption against known-plaintext
attacks. The detailed development
has begun in [1] and will be presented
elsewhere.
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